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:M E ll 0 R A ltT D U U.
....

_______

On Monday, Augsut lst, Mr. Davison called on me
in New York, but he was not feeling well, and little
was accomplished toward the discussion of Far Eastern
a:f:fairs.

He gave a general impression that the foreign

adventureo of the group were almost more trouble than
. they were worth; that the group wao greatly impresoed
with its patriotism and the burden of expense and
trouble it was encountering in prosecuting this pol1t1ca.lfina.ncial affair; it wished to consult the desires of
the Governmen.t but wanted to knov1 where it stood.

Ile

remarked that the China business had cost them $70 1 000
in a year, that Kuhn , Loeb and Company, the National

City

~ank,

and the First National Bank knew nothing

about the business exoept when impressed with it by
being confronted with the expense account, that they
depended entirely upon the

~organs

for their informa.-

t ion, and attributed entirely to the Morgans their
finding themselves in this business.

At. Mr . Davison's

requeo~

the next day at eleven at a

I agreed to be present

~eting o~

the group .

At.

2

At this D'eting there were prooent J. P. Morgan, Sr.,

lr. Vanderlip, President of the City National Bank, Mr.
, Preeident

Otto

a.-

K~,

or

the First National :Bankt Mr.

of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and Mr. McKnight,

of J. P,.J!organ and Compaey .

I said I was fresh from

full discussion with the Secretary a.nd would be very
glad to explain to them the Department's views i:f" they
ould let
formed.

~

know as to what they desired to be in-

Mr . 1.torgan then made some rather vague renmrks

in the swre general tone as ?:.tr . Davison's of' the da.Y

before.

As to the Hukuang loan he said he supposed

everything was all right .

I said it appeared so , and

that the transaction seemed to have been a brilliant

success.

As to the Ch1n-a1 railway he spoke discourag-

ingly and enumerated many powers including Germany as

opposed.

I pointed out that Japan had agreed to partici-

pate upon condition of the construction of a branch line
and that as a. result 1t would seam that Japan ,ooµld not
now make more than perfunotori opposition

eve~it

aooepted

ti/'

the- Russian interpretation of the C_onvent ion of July 4

(Article 1) to the effect that Japan must join Russia in
opposition to this road, as one detrimental to legitimate
Russian railway interests.

~s for Russia we had had a
long

long and amioable correspondence, bJ1t the . present
Minister for Foreign Atfairs seemed absolutely oppoued

to the Chin-a1 road; although Russia admitted it oonld

not prevent its construction it gave notice of an in•
tontion to be disagreeable to China if the roadf were
built.

I recalled the

~act

that when Mr. Davison

consulted the Secretary about the

Chin~ai

~iret

project, the

Secretary had sa1d that it being an Anglo-American
project this Government would be disposed to support

it if the British Government did.

I emphasized the

~act

that indoed from the very first the Departraent had em-

phasized the groat desirability

or

having a po.erful

.American bank in China to avail

o~

all aorta of

op~or

tuni ties in the Far Ea.st since China was now only on
the threshhold of development, and I recapitulated the
matter or the Chin-a.1 railway, pointing cut that wren
this Government consulted Great llrita.in about the n-eu-

tralization plan Great Dri ta.in vary cord1al.ly approved
in principle, and had almost unequivocally
to supnort the Chin-ai railway.

underta~:an

Since then (an I ex•

plained with some frankness) the British Foreign Otfice
had persistently claimed to be . bound by an

'"

obsolet~·

Anglo-Russian agreement an:l by consideration for Jajpan.
\
I
I

'

·1

\

4

An for :British support it might come with a ol,a.nge

ot ministry or with a change ot heart Qn the part
o'f the preeent Government, which might result trom
the inoraasing op-poaition Of J3riti8h public Opinion
to the preAent

~r1t1sh

policy in China.

Of course

the rrojeet could be abandoned by this country and the
burden
bt~t

or

the loss ot prestige cast upon Great Er1tain 1

abandot"..zoont of the pr oje ot might perhaps be a severe

blow to the preetige of the United States .

Another

possibility would be eubetant1al German participation
with strong German diplomatic support, whether without
~ritish

support or ultimately with British support, --

the latter

""'°" ~being
7::~f:
one~ of

.t..e, I i'
~~ a.alla~le

t. t

importance .

/I

great political

Yr. Kt\'f}n renarked that he thought the Ger?:l&!ls would
be glad to join.

These things_,! eaid,,must be very ca.refu1ly and
deliberately considered by the Government .
---~ Perhaps

Mr. Menooal, the group's representative,

anxious to accomplish something quiokly,was sending too
eenoational reports

fro~

Peking .

At all events, the

Government had authorized the Legation to keep the Chinese
Government from losing courage and would continue to use

its

5

its influence so ta.r as China was conce:rned.
should be the role o'!

t~

It

group to do their part in

a quiet way to the same end.

In speaking particularly

to Ur. Horgan I tried to make it clear that to do any
real good the American bankers should go to China to
stay instead ot nnking spasmodic on1 superficial

torts.

et~

They all seem to have the teeling that American

business is so much easier that it ltardly paid them
/ to do this.

As to establishing a bank (in China.), just

ae to opening a Pan-American bank, u:r. Vanderlip com-

plained that they could not even get a charter without
an amendment to the Foderal banking law.
It was suggested that there be another mooting
later in the day, but Mr. Kahn said that I had ma.de
the Department's views very clear, that they would
better themselves

con~er

and reach some decision.

In summing up the situation, tho Goverrunent will
endeavor to encourage China in
open.

k~eping

opportunities

The group should quietly do the same by showing

no signs of retreating.

All concerned should wait

patiently and na1ntain the status quo pending development of the ultimate :British attitude, arid pend!ng
•.

oonsideration

by

the United States ot ma.king overtures

dipl.omtioally or through the 'ba.nkers for German o:o•

operation on a large soale .

"

